Decision-making strategies have traditionally been classified as either prescriptive/normative or descriptive/behavioral in nature. Proponents of prescriptive/normative decision-making models attempt to develop procedures for making optimal decisions while proponents of the descriptive/behavioral models look for a choice that meets a minimal set of requirements rather than an optimal set. This study compared an Expected Utility model (prescriptive/normative) and an Elimination by Aspects (descriptive/behavioral) model of career decision making. Both models were also compared with a "model-free" choice situation in which the decision-making strategy was not explicitly dictated by experimental procedure. The three decision-making strategies were compared in terms of quality of choices, types of careers chosen, and post-decision satisfaction. College students (N=101) completed the Work Values Inventory and participated in activities which involved operationalization of the three decision-making models. The results suggest that use of the Expected Utility model produced the "best quality" decisions for subjects.
Expected Utility and Sequential Elimination Models of Career Decision Making
Decision making is a process inherent in the human condition.
Decision theorists of all disciplines attempt to describe in an orderly way what variables influence choLzes (Edwards & Tversky, 1967) . The single most important factor accounting for the differences among the various decision theorists is the decision model assumed to be implemented by the decision maker.
Decision-making strategies have traditionally been classified as either prescriptive/normative or descriptive/behavioral in nature (Janis & Mann, 1977 ! Mitchell & Krumboltz, 1984 Pitz & Harren, 1980; Tyler, 1969) . Proponents of prescriptive/normative decisicn-making models attempt to develop procedures for making optimal decisions, i.e., decisions which meet a set of axioms that a completely 'rational" decision maker would consider desirable.
The rational decision maker, often called the "economic man," operates on the basis of deliberate and knowledgeable reasoning about the possible outcomes of his or her actions. The final choice is the one that will bring the rational decision maker maximum gain. In the case of risky choices (i.e., where outcomes are associated with different probabilities;, people act so as to maximize expected utility.
The expected utility of a particular choice or action is 2 computed by taking for each possible outcome or course of action or decision a number representing the subjective value or payoff of the choice and a number representing the probability of obtaining that payoff (referred to as its "strength of return"), multiplying the two together, and then adding across all possible outcomes of that course of action.
In spite of the apparent appeal of the Expected Utility model as a framework for processing decision-making situations (within the field of decision theory, it is held as the rational standard against which competing models are to be compared), its validity has been questioned theoretically, empirically and practically. Leading those who challenge the validity of the rational (optimizing) model of decision making has been Herbert Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1957 Simon ( , 1976 , who has noted that human beings do not have the 'wits to maximize ' (1976, p. 28 ) --meaning that determining all the potential outcomes of all feasible courses of action is an impossible demand on a person's resources and mental capabilities (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971 ).
The descriptive inadequacy cf the Expected Utility model has been widely documented. Tversky and his associates (Kahnemar. & Tversky, , 1984 Tversky, 1969 Tversky, , 1972 Tversky, , 1975 Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 Tversky & Satta"; h, 1979) have provided ample evidence suggesting that the axioms of the Expected Utility model are often violated. Theoretical and empirical considerations aside, Janis and Mann (1977) have suggested that even if it were humanly possible, the process of collecting and examinaing the huge amount of information required is costly in time, effort and money. However, in spite of the theoretical, 3 5 empirical, and practical difficulties associated with the model, it is still considered the best available strategy for decision making. Elster (1979) specifically has suggested that social and behavioral scientists should always be guided by a postulate of rationality, even when studying areas in which this postulate may end up being violated.
Proponents of descriptive/behavioral models of decision making disagree with the classical view of the decision maker as an 'economic man' operating according to a completely rational and optimizing strategy. In contrast to the prescriptive or behavioral model, the descriptive model of decision making suggent:: tnat people act/choose so as to satisfice, rather than to optimize; that is, decision makers look for a choice that is "good enough' rather than the best, a choice that meets a minimal set of requiremeLti, rather than an optimal set (Simon, 1955 (Simon, , 1957 (Simon, , 1976 .
The Elimination by Aspects (EBA) model of decision making proposed by Tversky and his associates (Tversky, 1972 (Tversky, , 1975 Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) is an intriguing and appealing version of a satisficing model. EBA is a probabilistic process model based on the successive elimination of choices. Within the model, each choice alternative is viewed as a collection of measureable aspects.
In each state of the process, an aspect is selected with a priority that is a function of its relative importance to the decision maker. The selection of an aspect eliminates all alternatives not satisfying the parvicular requirements, and the process continues until only a few (or one) alternatives remain.
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Five major career decision-making models that arise from classical decision theory (expected utility theory) have been
proposed.
These models have focused on issues such as information seeking (Clarke, Gelatt & Levine, 1965; Gelatt, 1962) , balancing input costs and output gains in order to maximize net gains (Kaldor & Zytowski, 1969) , work-related values (Katz, 1963 (Katz, , 1966 , conflict and stress (Janis & Mann, 1977) , and the interactions of genetic, environment and learning influences (Krumboltz & Baker, 1973; Krumboltz & Hamel, 1977) . Although only the Kaldor and Zytowski model is mathematical in nature, all five predict with mathematical certainty that if specific procedures are followed, the resulting decision will be the one that maximizes expected gains for the decision maker.
In all five models, the decision maker is required to consider the entire range of options, assign utility values to each outcome, estimate the likelihood that the outcome will occur if it is pursued, and choose the outcome with the highest expected utility value (Mitchell & Krumboltz, 1984) .
Develupments within descriptive/behavioral career decision models have been rather limited in number and in scope. The few behavioral strategies that have been associated with the process of career choice have not been studied within an experimental framework, but rather offered as decision-making strategies that are justified within a context of anecdotal data. The simplest variant of a descriptive model is the 'single -rule strategy" (Janis & Mann, 1977) . Examples of single decision rules include moral or ethical ruled (Bedau, 1979; Schwartz, 1970) such as choosing a career following the wishes of one's parents because 5 one should 'honor thy father and mother" (Mitchell & Krumboltz, 1984) , or 'practical' rules such as choosing to "do what I did the last time because it worked' (or the opposite, if it didn't) (Janis & Mann. 197i) . A third type of single-rule strategy can be described as 'choosing by consensus," which is exemplified when a career is selected because it is recommended by most people whose advice the decision maker sought.
With the above as background, the purpose of this study was to compare the Expected Utility (prescriptive/normative) and
Elimination by Aspects (sequential elimination) (descriptive/behaviral) models as applied to career decision making. Both models were also compared to a 'model-free" choice situation in which the decision-making strategy followed was not explicitly dictated by experimental procedure. The three decision-making strategies were compared in terms of (a) quality of choices --defined in terms of the expected utilty values of the career chosen, (b) types of careers chosen, and (c) postdecisional satisfaction.
Method

Subjects
One hundred one students (42 male, 59 female) enrolled in introductory psychology classes at a major midwestern university served as subjects. Thirty-three percent were freshmen, 29% were sophomores, 25% were juniors, and 13% were seniors. Operationalization of the decision-makinq models
Model-free approach.
To assess career choice when unguided by an explicit model, subjects were presented with a list of 18 occupations. These occupations had been selected based on a pilot study which assured that (a) the subjects were familiar with the occupations and (b) the occupations represented each of Holland's (1966) six work environments (3 in each). The order of presentation of the occupations was determined by random selection. Subjects were asked to rank these occupations in terms of desirabilty, with #1 assigned to the occupation they considered most desirable, and #18 to the occupation they would be least likely to choose. Subjects were also asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 9, how satisfied they were with their top choices, where 1=very dissatisfied, 9=very satisfied.
Sequential elimination approach (elimination by aspects, EBA).
All subjects began with an indentical list of 18 occupations (the same occupations used in the Model-Free approach). They were instructed to select from that list the occupations which they considered acceptable in terms of X, where X represented some work value. The instrument designed to gather this information was individually tailored for each subject, with the work value first presented being the value ranking highest for the subject on his/her WVI. From the list of occupations selected by the subject as being acceptable in terms of the value, the subject was then to select those occupations that were accepatable jr, terms of Y, the work value raking second highest on the subject's WVI. Each subject's major area of study had been classified according to Holland's (1972) typology. An analysis of variance performed on the mean expected utility values of top choices selected by subjects of different majors in the three decisionmaking situations indicated no significant interaction effect, F(8, 176) = 1.61, p = .012, nor was there a significant main effect for college major, F(4, 88) = 0.802, p = .53.
The frequencies with which top choices of Holland's (1966) six career type: were sele:tod in the different decision-making situations were analyzed using Cochran Q tests (Siegel, 1956) .
Choices made by 85 of the 101 subjects were analyzed. Excluded were subjects who terminated the Sequential Elimination process with multiple choices (n = 14) and two subjects with missing data. Insert Table 2 about here
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests (Siegel, 1956) performed on the distributions of choice-type for men and women 
Discussion
The present study was undertaken to explore both theoretical and practical aspects of career decision making. Investigating the concept of "quality" of choice in the context of various models career decision making was a major purpose of the study.
Although Expected Utility theory has been criticised with respect to its adequacy as a normative model of decision making, most decision theorists accept the Expected Utility model's prescriptions as leading to ideal choices (Elster, 1979; Pitz & Harren, 1980; Savage, 1954; Tversky, 1975) . On the strength of the positions proffered by these theorists, "ideal career choice" in the present study was defined as the career selected in the Expected Utility situations, i.e., the career that yielded the highest expected utility value to the individual. Research on career self-efficacy may help to explain this finding. Specifically, Betz and Hackett (1981) found that college women's career choice behaviors were negatively affected by their self-perceptions as inefficacious in careers traditionally held by men (also see Branch & Lichtenberg, 1987) .
They hypothesized that women's self-observations and wor'dview generalizations (Krumboltz & Rude, 1981) may be conditioned by past discriminatory practices (Siegfried, Graham, Moore & Young, 1981) associated with society's traditionally narrow range of occupations that are "suitable for women" ).
Consequently, it is possible that women's "spontaneous" (i.e., Model-Free) career choir:es may have deviated from their 'ideal" due tc narrow exposure to some careers that are considered desirable by all, which in turn may be due to a less secure or confident approach to career selection.
Indirect evidence to support this interpretation can be found in the present study. Overall, women were less satisfied than men with their choices in both the Sequential Elimination (mean satisfaction 6.47 and 7.49, respectively) and the ModelFree (mean satisfaction 6.27 and 7.05, respectively) situations.
The increasing number of women in the work force, and the legal 16 issues mandating their upward mobility (Siegfried, et al., 1981) are likely to change society's expectations with respect to women and work.
Meaningful changes, however, may be slow to occur. It Tversky, 1972) . It consisted of a 15-step process leading to a single (or multiple but equivalent) career choice. Seventy-eight percent of the subjects were able to select a single career in fewer steps; the minimum number of steps required was 4, and the median was 11. Eighty-eight percent of the subjects chose one career. Of the others, nine subjects selected two careers at the end of the process, two subjects chose three careers, and only one subject terminated the process having chosen four caree:s.
In nine of these 12 multiple career choice cases, the ideal career (i.e., the one selected in the Expected Utility model) was When the degrees of similarity in frequencies with which specific career types (Holland, 1972) were chosen across the three decision-making situations, it was found that subjects tended to ci,00se careers of the same type whether in the Sequential Elimination or in the Model-Free situation.
Differences were found, however, between the Expected Utility (Gati, 198; Tversky, 1972 ) that decision makers do not naturally follow an Expected Utility-like decision-making process.
In the present study, significant differences were found consistently between the Model-Free situation and the Expected Utility model when quality and type of choice was evaluated.
No differences in the types of careers selected were found when the (Tinsley & Heesacker, 1984) . To the extent that this was the case, it is possible that subjects might have found the process frustrating, thereby obscuring the sources of subject variability and rendering the Sequential Elimination process deficient in terms of its sensitivity to pick-up differences in the models. In this regard, the multiple career choices at the end of the Sequential Elimination process might be interpreted as an artifact of an irrelevant value list on which to base the elimination of career options.
Nevertheless, the Sequential Elimination process remains appealing, if only because it is relatively easy to apply, it involves no numerical computations, and it is easy to explain and defend in terms of the priority ordering of the work values CO considered (Gati, 198 Tversky, 1972) . Work values can be identified by standard inventories, by asking decision makers to imagine ideal careers, or by instructing subjects to "ask 20 questions that would produce the information mc,st helpful in choosing an occupations' (Gati, 1984, p.18) . The next step involves ranking those work values; and following that, occupational alternatives are identified and the Sequential Elimination process begins. This is largely the model that computer-assistent career guidance programs (e.g., SIGI) follow.
But from the point of view of 'rationality,' the Expected Utility model remains the standard against which other decisionmaking models are measured. With respect to the Sequential Elimination model, an uncritical application of the model may lead to poor decisions, since the model fails to ensure that the alternatives that are retained along the process are, in fact, superior to the one eliminated.
Thus, as simple and appealing as the Sequential Elimination process may seem to be, its successful application in the career decision-making field may be greatly assisted by a familiarity with the process, an awareness of its potential disadvantages, anJ the guidance olf a competent counselor. Table 2 Frequency 
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